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Is Theoretical Biology Transiting a Cognitive Revolution?

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Tiago Rama at Universidad de la República de Uruguay
Tiago Rama
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Abstract

The foundations of biology have been a topic of debate for the past few decades. The traditional perspective of the Modern Synthesis, which portrays organisms as passive entities with limited role in evolutionary theory, is giving way to a new paradigm where organisms are recognized as active agents, actively shaping their own phenotypic traits for adaptive purposes. Within this context, this article raises the question of whether contemporary biological theory is undergoing a cognitive revolution. This inquiry can be approached in two ways: from a theoretical standpoint, exploring the centrality of the cognitive sciences in current theoretical biology; and from a historical perspective, examining the resemblance between the current state of theoretical biology and the Cognitive Revolution of the mid-20th century. Both inquiries yield affirmative answers, though important nuances will be emphasized. The cognitive sciences' explanatory framework is employed to elucidate the agentic characteristics of organisms, establishing a clear parallelism between the Cognitive Revolution and the present state of theoretical biology. I) Is there a cognitive revolution occurring in theoretical biology? Certainly, it is imperative to elucidate the question before attempting to provide an answer. With this objective in mind, I will suggest two potential interpretations (Rama, forthcoming). The first interpretation, termed the theoretical perspective, aims to ascertain if elements of the cognitive sciences' explanatory framework are starting to assume a pivotal role in contemporary theoretical biology. In essence, it seeks to determine whether a theory from one field is impacting or interacting with a theory from another discipline. This involves an epistemic expansion of the concepts and explanations derived from the cognitive sciences into the realm of biology. On the other hand, there is a historical interpretation. According to this interpretation, we ask ourselves whether the events in the history of science from which cognitive science emerged are similar to the current situation in theoretical biology and the various controversies that have been on the table for several decades (which we will discuss in the next section). In this sense, the expression Cognitive Revolution (with capital letters) refers to a historical event in science that took place in the 1950s and that led to the emergence of the cognitive sciences and the abandonment of the behavioral model that had prevailed until then (Miller 2003). The motivation for asking about a cognitive revolution in biology is that the foundations of the biological theory are under serious dispute. The Modern Synthes represents the mainstream framework that has received different challenges in the last decades, particularly from developmental biology. The main motivation, therefore, is that while development was black-boxed in the Modern Synthesis-we need not
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Tiago Rama
University of the Republic of Uruguay
[email protected]
79. Philosophy of the Life Sciences
Philosophy World Congress
1-8 August 2024
Rome, Italy
Is Theoretical Biology Transiting a Cognitive Revolution?
Abstract: The foundations of biology have been a topic of debate for the past few decades. The
traditional perspective of the Modern Synthesis, which portrays organisms as passive entities with
limited role in evolutionary theory, is giving way to a new paradigm where organisms are
recognized as active agents, actively shaping their own phenotypic traits for adaptive purposes.
Within this context, this article raises the question of whether contemporary biological theory is
undergoing a cognitive revolution. This inquiry can be approached in two ways: from a theoretical
standpoint, exploring the centrality of the cognitive sciences in current theoretical biology; and from
a historical perspective, examining the resemblance between the current state of theoretical biology
and the Cognitive Revolution of the mid-20th century. Both inquiries yield affirmative answers,
though important nuances will be emphasized. The cognitive sciences' explanatory framework is
employed to elucidate the agentic characteristics of organisms, establishing a clear parallelism
between the Cognitive Revolution and the present state of theoretical biology.
Keywords: Cognitive Revolution; Theoretical Biology; Conceptual Change; History and Philosophy of
Biology; Cognitivism.
I) Is there a cognitive revolution occurring in theoretical biology? Certainly, it is imperative to
elucidate the question before attempting to provide an answer. With this objective in mind, I will
suggest two potential interpretations (Rama, forthcoming).
The first interpretation, termed the theoretical perspective, aims to ascertain if elements of the
cognitive sciences' explanatory framework are starting to assume a pivotal role in contemporary
theoretical biology. In essence, it seeks to determine whether a theory from one field is impacting or
interacting with a theory from another discipline. This involves an epistemic expansion of the
concepts and explanations derived from the cognitive sciences into the realm of biology. On the
other hand, there is a historical interpretation. According to this interpretation, we ask ourselves whether
the events in the history of science from which cognitive science emerged are similar to the current
situation in theoretical biology and the various controversies that have been on the table for several
decades (which we will discuss in the next section). In this sense, the expression Cognitive Revolution (with
capital letters) refers to a historical event in science that took place in the 1950s and that led to the
emergence of the cognitive sciences and the abandonment of the behavioral model that had prevailed until
then (Miller 2003).
The motivation for asking about a cognitive revolution in biology is that the foundations of the biological
theory are under serious dispute. The Modern Synthes represents the mainstream framework that has
received dierent challenges in the last decades, particularly from developmental biology. The main
motivation, therefore, is that while development was black-boxed in the Modern Synthesis -we need not
look into it to explain evolution- “the black box [of development] is now being opened to provide a more
complete picture of what really happens” (Bateson and Gluckman, 2011, 17). The lesson here is that the
philosophy of modern biology is going through a period of profound debate, driven by multiple empirical
advancements that urge us to reconsider the underpinnings of biology. This is particularly signicant
because, according to the reductionist framework of the Modern Synthesis, "an immense amount of
biology was missing" (Lewontin, 2010). In the present context, developing organisms have regained their
central position in theoretical biology (Baedke, 2018; Bateson, 2005). This paper asks whether the new
understanding of developing organisms involves a cognitive revolution (under a theoretical or historical
interpretation),
II) Concerning the theoretical interpretation, I will argue that cognitive sciences indeed oer fundamental
conceptualizations and experimental frameworks for comprehending the cognitive capacities of
organisms. I will show dierent examples where cognitive science oods theoretical biology, from basal or
minimal cognition (Kovác2006; Lyon et al. 2021; Levin et al. 2021; Van Duijn et al. 2006) to plant
cognition (Marder 2013; Calvo and Keijzer 2011).
However, this conclusion necessitates nuanced consideration due to the diverse positions that can be
adopted: cognitive science can be explanatorily useful and necessary in dierent ways. Firstly, there is the
question of which theories within cognitive science should be applied to biology, with various possibilities
ranging from classical cognitivism to radical post-cognitivism (enactivism, ecological psychology).
Simultaneously, there are divergences concerning the concepts applicable to cognitive science, with some
asserting that all living organisms possess mental properties, while others, adopting less radical stances,
contend that certain paradigmatic properties of cognitive systems, such as memory, perception, or
learning, can be observed in unicellular organisms. In other words, there are dierent continuity theses
(Auletta 2011; Wiese and Friston 2021; Wheeler 2011; Rama, 2021), such as life-mind, life-cognition,
life-perception, and life-consciousness. Each thesis is dierent and requires dierent conceptual and
methodological apparatus from cognitive science. The current landscape is, therefore, marked by diversity.
A central aim is to approach the theoretical question from this diversity.
However, if we zoom out and see the general panorama, we can conclude a common thread across all
positions is the acknowledgment that organisms are active agents in their own existence, not merely
passive systems controlled by genetic factors. Despite the diverse connections that may exist between
theoretical biology and the cognitive sciences, a point of convergence within this pluralism can be
identied. In all instances, the common objective is to rationalize the role of organisms as active entities.
As emphasized by Dennett and Levin (2020): "Biology's next great horizon is to understand cells, tissues,
and organisms as agents with agendas." This concept starkly contrasts with the perspective of the Modern
Synthesis, where organisms are viewed not as active agents but as passive objects in explaining evolution
(Sultan et al., 2021). In broad terms, it can be asserted that all applications of the cognitive science
framework strive to grasp, or are linked to, the agentive dimension of organisms. In simpler terms, the
unifying proposition across various applications of cognitivism can be termed the agency-life continuity
thesis: Every living system is an agent, and every agent possesses life. It is worth noting that the notion of
agency is intricate, and while there exists a dedicated discipline for articial agents, eorts have been made
to elucidate the characteristics dening the agency of living systems (e.g., Barandiaran et al., 2009). Thus,
utilizing cognitive science frameworks in biology serves as an endeavor to elucidate the agency of
organisms.
III) Regarding the historical question, my inquiry can also yield an armative response. The crucial
historical concerns of the parallelism between behaviorism and the Modern Synthesis on one hand, and
between the cognitive science and the new proposal in biology that came to challenge the Modern
Synthesis. Three pertinent parallelisms are underscored:
(a) the analogy between behaviorism and the Modern Synthesis,
(b) the correlation between the cognitive sciences and contemporary propositions in theoretical
biology, and, most signicantly,
(c) the shared reasons for transitioning from one theory to another—moving from behaviorism to
cognitive sciences and from the Modern Synthesis to novel propositions in theoretical biology.
Concerning (a), the most notable parallelism between behaviorism and the Modern Synthesis becomes
evident when examining their explanatory models (Amundson 1990). In both instances, a black box is
posited, suggesting that delving into its contents is unnecessary for accomplishing scientic objectives.
The behavioral model relies on three variables: a perceptual input, a behavioral output, and a
reinforcement—whether positive or negative—of the connection between input and output. Similarly,
these three elements are present in the evolutionary model of the Modern Synthesis: a genetic input
(inheritance), a phenotypic output (variation), and selection—whether positive or negative—of traits
(tness).
Regarding (b), the parallelism between the cognitive sciences and the novel propositions in theoretical
biology is readily apparent, as both endorse a similar principle: the adaptability of a system should be
elucidated in relation to the internal processes within the system. Neglecting the internal processes of a
system implies forsaking the underlying causes that drive its interactions with the environment.
Finally, concerning (c), the most important aspect of this historical analysis is that the reason for moving
beyond behaviorism and the Modern Synthesis are pretty similar (Rama 2022; Rama 2023). In both cases,
a black box was open and the need to study internal processes became evident. The black box of the mind,
built on behaviorist grounds, states that it is not necessary or even possible to understand mental
phenomena. Similarly, the Modern Synthesis also neglected any explanatory role in developmental
processes. Life science moved forward by realizing that such intrinsic phenomena cannot be black-boxed:
mental and developmental processes need to be explained. In front of such needs, both disciplines
provided a similar key.
However, the armative response to the historical question warrants a caveat. The depiction of the role of
cognitive science in contemporary theoretical biology was framed as a potential "Cognitive Revolution" in
biology. Within the context of the philosophy of science, the term "revolution" carries a substantial
connotation. It is not asserting the occurrence of a scientic revolution in theoretical biology, as
acknowledged earlier, given the diverse viewpoints in revisiting the foundations of the Modern Synthesis.
The primary reason for employing the term "Cognitive Revolution" is heuristic—it serves as a means to
represent and comprehend the present state of theoretical biology through a historical comparison with
the Cognitive Revolution of the 1950s.
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